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application of these exceptions 8 has led a leading expert in the field
to say that "[t]he law embodied in the holdings clearly is that sometimes exhaustion is required and sometimes not."49 Widespread judicial awareness of section 10(c) can simplify and standardize application of the doctrine by limiting its use to situations where a statute
expressly demands exhaustion, or alternatively, where an agency both
requires exhaustion and makes its action inoperative pending appeal.

IX.

JUDICIAL REVrEW-PRIMARY JURISDICTION

ANTITRUST

VIOLATIONS AND THE COMMODITIES

EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange' the Supreme Court held
for the first time that the securities industry is not exempt from the
federal antitrust laws, 2 and promulgated the "necessary to make the
Act work ' 3 test to reconcile the Securities Exchange Act with the
Clayton and Sherman Acts. The Silver opinion, however, left unresolved 4 the important and complex question of primary jurisdiction'
and Isbrandtsen Co. v'. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert deniedsub nora. Federal
Maritime Bd. v. United States, 347 U.S. 990 (1954) (irreparable injury threatened); Skinner &
Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919) (jurisdictional challenge allowed). See also 3
DAVIS § 20.01, at 56.
48. E.g., 3 DAvis § 20.02, at 60, 66-67.
49. Id. § 20.01, at 56.
1.373 U.S. 341 (1963).
2. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970), and the Sherman Act, id. §§ 1-7.
3. 373 U.S. at 357; see notes 28-30 infra and accompanying text.
4. The Silver Court stated:
Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scrutiny of a particular exchange ruling . . . a different case would arise concerning exemption from the
operation of laws designed to prevent anticompetitive activity, an issue we do not decide
today. 373 U.S. at 358 n.12.
Ordinarily the question of primary jurisdiction arises where a claim is brought before a court
and it is asserted that the court's jurisdiction to decide a pertinent issue has been superseded by
an agency's authority. JAFFE 121-22. Since the Supreme Court in Silver concluded that the SEC
had no power to consider the plaintiff's complaint, jurisdiction vested only in the court. The
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to apply the "necessary to make the Act work" test. The primary
jurisdiction issue was confronted directly for the first time in the 1971
decision, Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,' a case involving
reconciliation of the Commodities Exchange Act 7 and the antitrust
laws.
In Ricci, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a
private treble damage action for antitrust violations charging a mercantile exchange, its officers and a member with non-observance of
exchange rules and regulations could not be initiated in federal court.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was held to require that the
Commodities Exchange Commission or the Secretary of Agriculture
first be allowed an opportunity to enforce compliance with the rules
imposed upon exchanges and their members. In his complaint the
plaintiff, a former member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, alleged that another commodities broker persuaded the Exchange and
its officers to divest plaintiff of his membership and transfer it to a
third party. Plaintiff brought an action under the Clayton Act,8 alleging that the transfer was made pursuant to an unlawful conspiracy
that prevented him from trading on the Exchange and demanding an
injunction and treble damages against the Exchange, its officers and
the member broker. The district court granted the defendants' motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, on the ground that conduct regulated by the Commodities
Exchange Commission is exempt from the antitrust laws. On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the action to the district
court, holding that a cause of action had been stated. In ordering a
remand, the appellate court invoked the administrative law doctrine
of primary jurisdiction and instructed the district court to stay its
Supreme Court's rationale for deciding that the SEC had no jurisdiction has been severely
criticized as "amateurish" and as a means for "slithering past the difficult issue of primary
jurisdiciton." Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public,22 STAN.
L. REV. 675, 687 (1970). See also note 29 infra.
5. See generally DAVIS §§ 19.01-.09; JAFFE 121-34.
6. 447 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,40 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1972) (No.

71-858).
7. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17b (1970).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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proceedings pending any action by the Commodities Exchange Commission.'
Primary jurisdiction is a doctrine under which a court may defer
to an administrative body for the determination of an issue relevant

to a particular controversy. Although easily confused with the substantive aspects of a case, the issue of primary jurisdiction must be
kept distinct from the resolution of a claim on the merits. With re-

spect to primary jurisdiction, the sole question to be decided is
whether the court or the agency is the proper tribunal to make the

initial decision of a substantive issue. The foremost justification for
the doctrine has been the promotion of "proper relationships between

the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties."' 0 The earliest case" stressed the importance of uniformity that would result if an agency were the sole body to decide admin-

istrative questions.

2 This

philosophy was later extended in Great

Northern Railway v. Merchants Elevator Company, 3 where the

Court also emphasized the expertise and specialized knowledge possessed by agencies.1

A review of the primary jurisdiction cases dealing specifically with
the application of the antitrust laws to industries regulated by administrative agencies reveals additional factors considered important by

the Cdurt.15 The issue of primary jurisdiction in an antitrust suit was
first considered in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.'" In that

case, the Court reasoned that a statute establishing a regulatory process and a reparation mechanism should be read as having superseded

the previously enacted antitrust laws. This result, although purporting
to resolve a primary jurisdiction question, seems to go even further
9. 447 F.2d at 720.
10. United States v. Western R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
1I.Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
12. Id. at 440-41.
13. 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
14. Id. at 291 (dictum).
15. See generally L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERiALS 669-93 (1968).
16. 260 U.S. 156 (1922). The case involved a private shipper who brought an antitrust suit
claiming a conspiracy to fix rates. The ICC had previously determined that the rates in question
were not discriminatory. B3catise the agency had already acknowledged the legality of the
rates, and because the Act to regulate Commerce, Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 279, created a
remedy in damages, the Court held that plaintiff did not have an additional remedy under the
antitrust laws. 260 U.S. at 162.
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and decide that, due to supersession, the federal district court lacked
any jurisdiction. 7 Subsequent antitrust suits were similarly dismissed

by the Court on the basis of supersession and agency expertise.' In
1957, however, the Court in FederalMaritime Board v. Isbrandtsen
Company, 19 indicated a reluctance to continue to defer to agencies.
Instead, it engaged in a meticulous examination of statutory language
to find congressional intent to limit the agency's power to immunize

from the antitrust laws certain practices of the regulated industry.
Isbrandtsen marked the first of a continuing series of cases concen-

trating on the breadth of a particular regulatory scheme and the
17. Professor Jaffe characterizes this result as either reaching beyond primary jurisdiction
or illustrating the most extreme extension of the doctrine. JAFF 143.
18. See, e.g., United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 184 U.S. 474 (1932). [The
plaintiff sought a court injunction charging that a conference of other shipping companies had
joined together in anticompetitive practices against plaintiff. By the Shipping Act of 1916, 39
Stat. 728, the Shipping Board had been granted both the power to immunize industry practices
from antitrust consequences and to prohibit anticompetitive practices by using cease and desist
orders. Because of the existence of these powers in the agency, and because the alleged antitrust
violations contravened the Shipping Act and were remediable under the Act, the Court held that
the antitrust laws had been superseded. 284 U.S. at 485]; Far East Conference v. United States,
342 U.S. 570 (1952) [Far East was factually similar to Cunard but concerned an antitrust suit
for an injunction br6ught by the United States government rather than by a private party. The
government claimed that the defendant conference was engaging in a practice of discriminatory
rates. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter set forth what has been
considered to be the classic statement of the policy behind primary jurisdiction:
[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases
requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for
regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts
after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve as a premise for legal
consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of
business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review
by the judiciary are more rationally exercised by preliminary resort for ascertaining and
interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped
than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible
procedure. Id. at 574-75].
19. 356 U.S. 481 (1958). Plaintiff, a non-member of the defendant shipping conference,
alleged that defendant's rates were discriminatory. The Federal Maritime Board had already
given its approval of the conference rate plan in question. However, the Court held that the
agency's power to immunize as granted by the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42
(1970), formerly Act of Sept. 7, 1916, ch. 451, §§ 1-36, 39 Stat. 728, could not insulate
conference members from antitrust liability where the agency-approved rate plan discriminated
against a non-member of the conference because such a practice was expressly outlawed by the
Act. 356 U.S. at 491. It is interesting that the subsequent legislative reaction to the Court's
construction of the statutory scheme seems to indicate disapproval of the Isbrandtsen result.
See L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, supra note 15, at 687-88. Nevertheless, the case is important
because its incorporation of careful statutory constructionreflecs a change in approach to the
question of primary jurisdiction in antitrust cases.
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existence of express statutory grants of immunity from the antitrust

laws to resolve the primary jurisdiction question."0 Under this analysis
the primary jurisdiction doctrine becomes applicable when an agency

has "pervasive" power over the industry regulated.' Specifically, this
includes situations in which an agency has been granted the power to

immunize the same practices that allegedly comprise the antitrust
violation or where the administrative body has been entrusted with
enforcement of the antitrust laws and may provide a remedy for

anticompetitive behavior. 2 The concentration on express statutory
20. See. e.g., California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962). This case involved the acquisition of
stock of one gas company by another. The Natural Gas Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. 717f (1970), requires
Federal Power Commission approval for any such acquisition. However, the Court decided that
primary jurisdiction did not lie in the agency since the Act did not explicitly grant the FPC
power to immunize mergers from the antitrust laws. 369 U.S. at 485-86. As additional support
for denying primary jurisdiction in the agency, the Court pointed out the absence of a "pervasive
regulatory scheme" that otherwise might include or supersede the antitrust laws. Id. at 485.
See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), where a bank merger,
which had been approved by the Comptroller of Currency, was alleged to be violative of the
antitrust laws. The Court noted a lack of pervasiveness with respect to the agency's powers over
the industry regulated and concluded that the authority to approve of a merger was not tantamount to a grant of power to immunize. Thus, the agency did not have primary jurisdiction
and the antitrust suit was properly brought in federal court. Id. at 350-55.
21. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). The defendants in'Pan American had allegedly violated the antitrust laws by conspiring in the allocation
of air routes. In an antitrust suit prosecuted by the United States, the Court dismissed the
complaint and held that primary jurisdiction was in the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Court
viewed the CAB as having expansive regulatory powers over the industry as a result of its power
to immunize and its power to issue cease and desist orders to prohibit a wide range of unfair
and anticompetitive practices. By virtue of this pervasive scheme, the Court concluded that all
the issues raised by the government's complaint had been entrusted to the agency by Congress,
The Court, however, limited its holding by noting that, although it was not required to "determine the ultimate scope of the Board's power," id. at 312, the CAB had "no power to award
damages," and did not "have jurisdiction over every antitrust violation by air carriers," id. at
311-12. The 1971 decision, Breen Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 30 AD, L.2D 76
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), involved a variation on the holding in Pan American. In Breen, the CAB had
initially granted approval of an agreement, but defendants had engaged in anticompetitive
behavior allegedly outside the scope of the CAB approved conduct. Defendant contended that
the CAB's action conferred antitrust immunity on the agreement and that the agency had
primary jurisdiction over the claim. The federal district court disagreed, asserting that "to
permit the new activities to be insulated [from antitrust liability] would achieve indirectly what
could not be done directly," id. at 77, and refused to invoke primary jurisdiction in the CAB.
The court relied on the grounds that the allegedly illegal activities did not appear to be "necessary" to comply with the CAB order and that plaintiff sought only treble damages which the
agency had no authority to give. Id.
22. The recent case of United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, F. Supp.
CCH
TRADE REG. REP.
73,737, at 91,098 (D. Colo. 1971), an antitrust suit against a motor carrier
that involved the Interstate Commerce Act, extensively discusses the evolutionary process
which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has undergone. The court, closely following the Pan
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powers means that agency expertise, standing alone, is given only
2
limited weight. 1
The applicability of antitrust laws to commodities exchanges remains an unsettled question. Despite the fact that early antitrust attacks failed 24 the vitality of these decisions is questionable in light of
the more recent legislative and case law developments. 25 To further
adumbrate the present impact of federal antitrust laws on commodities exchanges, analogies must be drawn from the field of securities
regulation.2 1 Until recently, the Securities Exchange Act 2 was
American approach, emphasized the "pervasiveness" of the statutory scheme. Id. at 91,105.
The court held that primary jurisdiction was in the ICC, mentioning agency expertise and the
avoidance of conflict as further policy justifications for the invocation of primary jurisdiction.
Id. at 91,108.
23. Expertise is pertinent only to the extent that a statute accords it importance. JAFFE 124.
24. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), which upheld the
"Call" rule, by which members of the Board of Trade "were prohibited from purchasing or
offering to purchase [specified commodities] during the period between the close of the Call [one
day] and the opening of the [next] session. . . at a price other than the closing bid at the Call."
Id. at 237. See also Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Board of Trade
v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604
(1898).
25. As presently formulated the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17b (1970),
embodies a policy of deterring "speculation, manipulation or control which are detrimental to
the producer or the consumer, [or the trader]." Id. § 5. Among the mechanics adopted to
effectuate these policies is the requirement that individual exchanges must enforce their own
rules relating to trading. The status of a "contract market" must be retained by an exchange
in order for it to qualify as an appropriate forum for commodities transfer. Id. § 6h. One
requirement for maintaining this designation is that the exchange comply with certain enumerated "duties of contract markets." Id. § 7a. By the 1968 amendments these duties were expanded to include enforcement of bylaws "relating to trading requirements," id. § 7a(8), and
bylaws "providing minimum financial standards and related reporting requirements." Id.
§ 7a(9); see Vogelson, Tightened Regulation for Commodity Exchanges, 55 A.B.A.J. 858
(1969). Upon a showing of any failure to fulfill these obligations, a Commission composed of
the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce and the Attorney General can suspend
or revoke the contract market designation and thereby render illegal any commodities transfer
engaged in at such market. 7 U.S.C. § 8 (1970). The Commission may also institute cease and
desist proceedings with possible misdemeanor sanctions against any contract market not enforcing its rules. Id. § 13a. Likewise, individuals who violate any rule or regulation promulgated
pursuant to the Act may be held accountable for such violations in an administrative proceeding. Id. § 13c(a).
26. The legislative controls of the commodities and securities industries are similar, particularly in their emphasis on self-regulation. See Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of the
Commodities Exchanges and the National Securities Exchanges, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 223
(1969). See generally Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public,
22 STAN. L. REv. 675 (1970); Johnston, Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Comment, An Approach for Reconciling Antitrust Law and
Securities Law: The Anti-Trust Immunity of the Securities Industry Reconsidered,65 Nw. U.L.
REv. 260 (1970).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970).
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thought to have exempted activities controlled by the New York
Stock Exchange from the antitrust laws. However, Silver v. New
Yoik Stock Exchange2 reversed this thinking by holding:
The Securities Exchange Act contains no express exemption from the antitrust
as implied only if necessary to make
laws... [and] [r]epeal is to be regarded
2
the Securities Exchange Act work. 1

The Silver court resolved the "necessary to make the Act work" test
in favor of the plaintiff, on the ground that the Securities Exchange
Act "afford[ed] no justification for [the defendant's] anticompetitive
collective action. ' 30 Since the New York Stock Exchange practice in
issue was not deemed necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
regulatory act, a violation of the federal antitrust laws was present.
The scope of Silver was placed in doubt by the much criticized 3 '
decision in Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers32 where it was alleged that the
minimum commission rates established by the New York Stock Exchange constituted a per se antitrust violation.3 3 The district court
28. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
29. Id. at 357. In Silver the New York Stock Exchange had deprived plaintiff, a nonmember securities broker, of his telephone connections to member firms without affording
hearing or notice to the plaintiff. The Court held that practices regulated by the New York
Stock Exchange were subject to the antitrust laws unless such practices were an integral part
of the regulatory scheme. In essence, the rule of the case is that a plaintiff will prevail on the
merits in an antitrust action against an exchange upon a showing that the exchange practice
under attack has an anticompetitive impact and its continued existence is not necessary to make
the act work. However, because of a technicality, the Silver Court did not confront the equally
important problem of determining which tribunal-a federal court or an agency-has primary
jurisdiction to hear the substantive antitrust claim. The Court reasoned that the antitrust
violation pertained to the enforcement of a rule and not to a rule itself. Finding that the SEC
could review only rules and not "particular instances of enforcement," id., see note 4 supra,
the Court held that in this instance, federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the merits
of the antitrust case.
30. 373 U.S. at 364.
31. See note 34 infra.
32. 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. 11. 1966), affd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
954 (1967).
33. The term "perse violation" developed from the judicial gloss placed upon the first two
sections of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970). Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911), enunciated the "rule of reason" standard which read the Sherman Act as
applying only to unreasonable restraints of trade. Consequently, any reasonable restraint of
trade is not punishable under the Act. Certain practices, however, such as group boycotts or
price fixing, are viewed as being intrinsically unreasonable or without redeeming virtues and thus
constitute '"perse violations." See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959) (group boycotts); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933)
(price fixing). See generally Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some
Reflections on the Klors Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1959); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
PerSe Concept: Price Fixingand Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); 75 YALE L.J. 373
(1966).
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concluded that the Securities Exchange Act granted the Exchange

power to fix commissions and issued an order in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a caustic dissent, however, Chief
Justice Warren denounced the analysis used by the lower courts as a
"blunderbuss approach [that fell] far short of the close analysis and
delicate weighing process mandated by . . .Silver.3' 4 According to
the Chief Justice, after finding that the agency was competent to

consider the antitrust question, the district court should have continued its study in an effort to reconcile the antitrust and regulatory
statutes. If this approach had been followed, the court would first

have had to resolve the question of primary jurisdiction, and thereby
determine whether a court or agency should initially decide if mini-

mum fixed commission rates were "necessary to make the Act
work."
A recent case which discusses primary jurisdiction in the context
of a securities exchange is Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock
Exchange.35 In Thill the plaintiff was a non-member broker who alleged that the Exchange's anti-rebate rule3" violated the federal antitrust laws. The lower court, using the same analysis as that in Kaplan,
granted summary judgment for the defendant and held that the commission rates were reviewable by the SEC and hence not subject to
34. 389 U.S. at 957. Several commentators have also criticized the Kaplan result. See. e.g.,
Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates:A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. Rav. 675,
691 (1970); Comment, An Approach for Reconciling Antitrust Law and Securities Law: The
Antitrust Immunity of the Securities Industry Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 260, 308-09
(1970). The Kaplan court apparently read the "different case" alluded to in footnote twelve of
the Silver opinion, see note 4 supra, as implying that antitrust immunity would obtain where
the conduct complained of was within the scope of SEC review.
35. 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied. 401 U.S. 994 (1971). Although the Thill
decision was not concerned directly with primary jurisdiction, the issue was raised in a concurring opinion. See notes 38, 39 infra and accompanying text.
36. The "anti-rebate rule," embodied in the Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange,
art. XV, § 1 (1970), provides as follows:
Commissions shall be charged and collected upon the execution of all orders for the
purchase or sale for the account of members or allied members or of parties not members
or allied members of the Exchange, of securities admitted to dealings upon the Exchange
and these commissions shall be at rates not less than the rates in this Article prescribed;
and shall be net and free from any rebate, return, discount or allowance made in any
shape or manner, or by any method or arrangement direct or indirect. . . .No member,
member firm or member corporation shall, in consideration of the receipt of listed
business and at the direct or indirect request of a non-member or by direct or indirect
arrangement with a non-member, make any payment or give up any work or give up all
or any part of any commission or other property to which such member, member firm
or member corporation is or will be entitled.
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antitrust attack. In rejecting this approach and reinstating plaintiff's
claim, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that a
harmonization of the Securities Exchange Act and the antitrust laws
is not precluded merely because a certain challenged practice might
also be subject to SEC review. Instead, "it is at this point that the
analysis of reconciliation really begins, ' '3 by an application of the
"necessary to make the Act work" test. The majority opinion in Thill
did not directly treat the issue of primary jurisdiction or apply the
Silver test. However, in a concurring opinion Chief Judge Swygert
noted that the problem of primary jurisdiction was "lurking in the
background" and was essential for the "proper resolution of conflicting antitrust and securities law."' 38 While pointing out that the question was not before the court at this stage in the litigation, Swygert
posited four criteria which the district court might employ to settle
the issue on remand. These included:
(1) whether and to what extent the SEC is empowered to consider antitrust
laws and policy in fulfilling its duty of review of exchange self-regulation;
(2) whether an aggrieved party may initiate SEC review of exchange rules
under the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act or the Administrative
Procedure Act;
(3) whether and to what extent SEC expertise would be useful in resolving,
in the first instance, the question of whether a given rule is necessary to make
the Securities Act work; and
(4) whether the anticompetitive aims of the Sherman Act can be achieved
without subjecting the exchanges to treble damage suits which necessarily result
if the 9doctrine of primary jurisdiction is unavailable to the defendant in this
3
case.

The majority opinion endorsed a proposal by plaintiff's counsel that
the SEC and Justice Department, both directly interested in the issues
at bar, be invited to participate by way of expert testimony and legal
argument." Although the statement was set forth in a context other
than that of primary jurisdiction, it imports a suggestion for the
resolution of that issue as well. To the extent that a court's procedure
permits the utilization of administrative expertise in an antitrust action, deference to an agency proceeding can no longer be looked to
as the sole technique for utilizing the agency as a respository of exper37. 433 F.2d at 269.
38. Id. at 276.
39. Id. at 277.
40. Id. at 273.
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tise. The court's procedural freedom will partially neutralize any advantage that an agency's expertise might initially create, and in resolving the question of primary jurisdiction the court will thus look
41
to factors other than expertise.
In Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange12 the court initially
asked whether the case was a proper one for invoking the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction-an issue which the earlier decisions in Silver,
Kaplan, and Thill had not confronted. The court recognized that the
plaintiff had claimed, among other theories of recovery, the existence
of a group boycott-a per se antitrust violation-for which the defendants would have to find "justification" in the Commodities Exchange Act. Although not explicitly mentioned, it seems clear that the
court considered an application of the "necessary to make the Act
work" test to be in order. Unlike Kaplan, the Ricci court refused to
dismiss the action solely because it was brought on a per se theory
against conduct arguably within the scope of agency regulation. Instead, Ricci followed Thill and Chief Justice Warren's dissent in
Kaplan by recognizing that such an allegation requires a reconciliation of the regulatory act and the antitrust laws.
The court refuted plaintiff's next argument purportedly based on
Silver. Plaintiff maintained that no "justification" could be inferred
from the Commodities Exchange Act that would condone the defendants' actions, and that this conclusion was reinforced by the fact that
he had been excluded from the Exchange without being afforded notice or hearing. Thus, the Exchange did not even reach the "threshold
of justification ' 4 3 alluded to in Silver. On these grounds plaintiff
asserted that Silver directly controlled, and thus his antitrust claim
should proceed to trial in federal court. The court of appeals conceded
arguendo that there might be a per se violation of the antitrust laws
without "justification" in this instance, but determined that this factor did not dispose of the primary jurisdiction issue. Apparently the
plaintiff had confused the primary jurisdiction question with the mer41. At least one other case, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
has cited with approval the Thill suggestion of appropriating agency expertise by utilizing expert
testimony. Id. at 272. Although this decision is not directly concerned with the issue of primary
jurisdiction, it does involve a class action against odd-lot dealers on the New York Stock
Exchange for violations of the federal antitrust laws.
42. 447 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1971).
43. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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its of the antitrust claim, and the court of appeals correctly made the
distinction. The court then noted that the Exchange had a duty to

enforce its own rules and regulations as they pertained to "trading
requirements." 44 This obligation arose by virtue of the Exchange's
designation as a "contract market" under the Commodities Exchange Act.4 According to the court plaintiff's antitrust allegations
encompassed violations of exchange rules relating to trading require-

ments, and as such "they could have been examined by the Commodities Exchange Commission or the Secretary of Agriculture." 4 Silver

was distinguished from the instant case on the grounds that the Silver
opinion did not have to reconcile any conflict or "co-extensiveness of

coverage" between a private antitrust suit and an agency remedy.
Evidently, the court felt that since there was potential agency jurisdiction over the practices that allegedly violated the antitrust laws, Ricci

was the "different case" referred to in the Silver opinion." As a
result, the Ricci court, unlike that in Silver, was required to resolve a

question of primary jurisdiction.
After determining the appropriateness of deciding the primary

jurisdiction issue, the court then looked to Thill Securities Corp. v.
New York Stock Exchange4 and the four guidelines that Chief Judge
Swygert suggested in his concurring opinion to resolve that point."
The majority in Ricci answered all four of the Thill questions in the
affirmative, concluding that primary jurisdiction was in the agency.
44. 447 F.2d at 717.
45. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
46. 447 F.2d at 718.
47. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 n.12 (1963); see note 4 stupra and
accompanying text.
48. 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,401 U.S. 994 (1971).
49. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. Resort to this four-fold test was necessary
because the court found no express exemption from the antitrust laws in the Commodities
Exchange Act. A possible criticism of Ricci arises from the court's use on the appellate level
of the four criteria set forth in Thill. The Ricci court engaged in the same determination that
Thill suggested the district court might subsequently undertake on remand. For this reason, a
remand in Ricci to the district court for the purpose of gathering evidence and then making the
four-fold Thill evaluation might have been more correct. Significantly, Judge Kerner, in his
dissenting opinion in Ricci, see notes 67-72 infra and accompanying text, pointed out that the
issue of primary jurisdiction had not been briefed or argued, 447 F.2d at 722 n.10, and asserted
that for this reason the Ricci court should remand the case to the district court for consideration
of the primary jurisdiction problem. It is also noteworthy that Chief Judge Swygert's approach
to primary jurisdiction in Thill was deliberate, and he intended that the district court consider
all four of the proposed criteria only after the taking of additional evidence. Consequently, the
Ricci holding on primary jurisdiction, even if correct, may reasonably be labelled premature.

Vol. 1972:115]

ADMINISTRATIVE LA W-1971

In regard to the first two questions they reasoned that the Commodities Exchange Commission was not expressly or implicitly barred
from weighing antitrust policy, and that the direct institution of proceedings was possible.50 These two parts of the Thill test, as applied
in Ricci, are most nearly analagous to the Supreme Court's inquiry
in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank5 1 of whether the
agency could "enforce the competitive standard clearly delineated"

by statute." A positive response to these questions presents a strong
basis for invoking primary jurisdiction because arguably such powers

in the agency show a congressional intent to entrust the agency with
enforcement of the antitrust laws. However, because the court of
appeals relied on the fact that there was no express bar to agency

consideration of antitrust principles, the correctness of the Ricci
court's approach to these two points is drawn into question as it
entails an inverted approach to deciding the issue of agency power to
remedy anticompetitive behavior.13 In Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. United States," the Supreme Court had previously resorted to
primary jurisdiction only after finding an affirmative grant of "broad
powers" in the agency to prohibit a wide range of anticompetitive
practices. Finding such powers by negative implication is therefore
50. The court said: "There exists no express or implied exemption in the Commodities
Exchange Act that would prevent the [agency] from taking into account antitrust principles in
their deliberations pursuant to the Act . . . . If indeed the allegedly anticompetitive transfer
of membership were in violation of Exchange rules, the Commission could have prevented it."
447 F.2d at 718-19.
51. 374 U.S. 321 (1963); see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
52. 374 U.S. at 351; see text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
53. The majority opinion is also troublesome because the regulations cited by the court do
not explicitly provide for an antitrust remedy in the agency. 447 F.2d at 719 nn.13-14, citing
17 C.F.R. §§ 0.3, 0.8, 0.53, 0.58 (1971). By id. §§ 0.3, 0.53, a complainant may file for the
institution of proceedings before the Commission, and subsequently by id. §§ 0.8, 0.58, petition
to intervene in such proceedings. Although the proceedings which can be initiated by a petitioner
pertain to "any violation of the act," id. § 0.3, they are merely called "Disciplinary Proceedings" and could conceivably be deemed an improper forum for remedying antitrust grievances.
Moreover, the individual who files an application to institute proceedings has "no legal status
in the proceedings . . . except [as an intervenor or witness]," id. §§ 0.3(b), 0.53(b). In order
to intervene, a party must petition for permission from the Commodities Exchange Commission
or the Secretary of Agriculture who "may" allow intervention where the petitioner shows,
among other factors, a "relationship to the matters involved in the proceeding." Id. §§ 0.8,
0.58. Because of the discretion in the Commission and Secretary of Agriculture on the question
of intervention, these regulations could be applied against a petitioner in a manner that would
deny him standing before any agency. In such a situation a petitioner would clearly have no
antitrust remedy in an agency for a breach of exchange rules.
54. 371 U.S. 296 (1963); see note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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clearly at odds with the Pan American rationale. Further, the traditional canon of statutory construction that "[i]mmunity from the
antitrust laws is not lightly implied," 55 argues against the Ricci
rationale. Despite these infirmities in its approach, the court of appeals may have redeemed itself by its footnote discussion of Pan
American and the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme." The footnote indicates that the court found an affirmative statutory conferral
of power to hear charges of anticompetitive behavior at least when
such behavior concerns the enforcement of exchange rules. This construction of the Commodities Exchange Act as granting the Commission "broad powers" over exchange rules and their enforcement
draws support from the strong statutory policy of exchange enforcement of rules and the Commission's numerous powers to remedy any
failure to enforce these rules.5 7 However, because the regulations
equivocate on the question of whether the Commission has power to
remedy an antitrust violation, the court's conclusion is still questionable.5
Assuming the correctness of the Ricci finding of remedial antitrust
powers in the Commission, Pan American poses problems in one
other regard. In Pan American the "broad jurisdiction" of the agency
encompassed most facets of the regulated industry,59 while in Ricci the
court found such pervasive powers only with respect to a single dimension of the commodities industry. Thus, the question presented is
whether an affirmative grant of broad agency jurisdiction over essentially all of the regulated industry is required by Pan American before
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to be considered, or whether a
pervasive delegation of authority over only that type of conduct which
is the subject matter of the antitrust attack will suffice. The Ricci
court adopted the latter position, reasoning that the Commodities
Exchange Commission's power over the enforcement of rules was
55. California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
56. The court stated:
Although the overall regulatory scheme in the instant case is less pervasive than the
scheme in Pan American, the specific allegations relate directly to the [agency's] power

to designate contract markets and allow the trading in futures by individuals. Such power
is no less basic to the regulatory scheme than it was [in Pan American]. 447 F.2d at 719
n.15.
57. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
59. 371 U.S. at 304. See note 21 supra.
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"basic to the regulatory scheme.""0 Hence the agency had been
charged with the duty of remedying anticompetitive conduct that
violated exchange rules. This conclusion appears to be the better
reasoned of the two alternatives, especially upon consideration of the
policy behind the "pervasiveness" test. In generaf, broad agency jurisdiction over anticompetitive actions illustrates a legislative intent
to confer the power of antitrust enforcement upon an administrative
body. Such intent logically applies to a limited range of practices as
well as to the industry at large. Depending upon the nature of the
industry and the type of regulatory system thought to be most beneficial for that industry, a combination of federal court and agency
jurisdiction over anticompetitive practices may be desirable. In the
commodities industry, agency inability to diligently enforce exchange
rules has had disasterous consequences, 6' and led Congress to specifically enhance agency powers over this area. Federal court antitrust
jurisdiction over the enforcement of commodities exchange rules
would, therefore, contravene the apparent congressional plan to have
an agency initially consider a matter so acutely important to the
commodities industry. Consequently, Ricci might be read as a case
attempting to achieve harmonization of the antitrust laws and a regulatory act by employing primary jurisdiction in a situation where all
the issues raised by the antitrust complaint pertained to matters over
which agency jurisdiction was extensive.
In response to the third Thill criterion, agency expertise, the Ricci
court pointed out that the plaintiffs complaint had raised questions
2
that were particularly within the agency's "watchdog function."
Evidently the court thought that the Commission's role as a "watchdog" would result in thorough knowledge of the intricacies of the
commodities industry. While the question of expertise has not controlled the issue of primary jurisdiction since the Supreme Court
decision in Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co.13 the Commodities Exchange Commission's expertise in this area should not be
ignored.
60. 447 F.2d at 719 n.15; see note 56 supra.
61. See Vogelson, supra note 25, at 858, citing, United States v. De Angelis, No. 452-63
(D.N.J., Dec. 23, 1963), a salad oil scandal case, as the major impetus for the 1968 Commodities Exchange Act amendments that included a provision requiring exchanges to enforce their
own rules relating to trading.
62. 447 F.2d at 719.
63. 356 U.S. 481 (1958). See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
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Finally, in answer to the fourth part of the Thill test,64 the Ricci
court asserted that the Commodities Exchange Commission would be
hindered in its self-regulatory duties if treble damage suits were permitted against an exchange. Although this contention may be true, it
is irrelevant to the allocation of primary jurisdiction. It must be
recognized that the Commission's self-regulatory duties are the product of the powers conferred upon it by statute and are restricted by
the limits of those powers. Therefore, federal antitrust jurisdiction
should not be interpreted as inhibiting the agency's performance of
its self-regulatory policy, but simply as a necessary result of Congress's limited grant of power to that agency. It must be assumed
that Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to remain in force
where the agency's powers are less than pervasive, and consequently
the aims of those laws will be achieved only by permitting antitrust
suits.
The most important aspect of the application of the Thill criteria
by the majority in Ricci was to find agency power to hear complaints
of anticompetitive behavior pertaining to the enforcement of rules.
The existence of this power strongly supports a finding of primary
jurisdiction in the agency. However, the lack of any inquiry concerning the agency's power to immunize industry practices from the antitrust laws is immediately obvious. The Supreme Court has seemingly
accorded both the power to immunize and the power to provide a
remedy for anticompetitive behavior equal importance in deciding the
issue of primary jurisdiction.6 5 The Ricci court briefly alluded to the
power to immunize in a footnote, but refused to consider it because
neither party had raised or briefed the issue. 6 This shortcoming in the
majority's analysis might be viewed as reversible error. An inquiry
concerning agency power to immunize a violation of exchange rules
from antitrust consequences is essential in resolving the question of
primary jurisdiction, for unless the agency's "broad powers" include
the power to immunize, resort to primary jurisdiction in the agency
is improper. Consequently, the Ricci court should have remanded to
64. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
66. The court said:

We express no opinion on any antitrust immunity that might result from action or
inaction taken by the [agency] in this case. The complicated issues of reconciliation of
the Commodities Exchange Act and the Sherman Act that would be presented will
require the benefit of brief and argument before any determination could be attempted.
447 F.2d at 720 n.18.
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the district court for a determination of at least this issue before
finding primary jurisdiction in the agency.
Judge Kerner, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
with the majority in reversing the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's suit, but opposed their disposition of the primary jurisdiction issue. Kerner argued that resort to the agency should be discretionary rather than mandatory. He noted that the case involved no
unconventional facts, and read part of the Commodities Exchange
Act 6 7 as obviating administrative discretion by commanding the
agency to enforce exchange rules. On this basis, Kerner contended
that the plaintiff's claim should have been remanded to the district
court for a decision on the merits. This line of his argument is weakened, however, by its reliance on the lack of need for agency expertise,
now a criterion of secondary importance. It is further weakened by
its reliance on the fact that the Commission has a mandatory duty to
enforce exchange rules. A mandatory duty supports rather than
rebuts the need for primary jurisdiction. To allow federal courts to
enforce exchange rules via the mechanisms of the anitrust law would
in many instances preclude the agency from initially performing its
mandatory function. In order to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the administrative system, primary jurisdiction in the Commodities Exchange Commission should be utilized.
Kerner further asserted that a proper application, of the Thill
criteria" would indicate that a remand to the district court should
have been ordered in Ricci. He set forth inter alia that a resort to
primary jurisdiction "needlessly [multiplied] the number of tribunals
involved in these proceedings" 9 and violated the notion that courts
67. Id. at 721, citing 7 U.S.C. § 7a(9) (1970).
68. Kerner contested the majority's reliance on Thill to support primary jurisdiction in the

Commission or the Secretary of Agriculture. He pointed out that a majority of the Thill panel
concurred in a remand to the district court rather than to the agency. Therefore, reasoned

Kerner, both judges must have concluded that primary jurisdiction in the agency was not proper,
and hence the majority view in Ricci was inconsistent with Thill. This conclusion is doubtful,
because in Thill Chief Judge Swygert specifically stated that the issue of primary jurisdiction

was not before the court. 433 F.2d 264, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1970). More importantly, the Thill
case was appealed only on the issue of summary judgment, and the district court proceedings
had not yet developed to a point where the issue of primary jurisdiction could be raised. The
majority in Ricci, however, did not contend that Thill was a controlling precedent on primary
jurisdiction. Instead, they merely adopted a list of criteria set forth as a possible means of
resolving that issue.

69. 447 F.2d at 722.
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are the traditional "repositories of antitrust expertise." 7 As to the
first reason cited, Kerner was concerned with the possibility that the
majority might have erred in concluding that the Commodities Exchange Commission could hear plaintiff's antitrust claim. He thus felt
that a determination of the agency's antitrust jurisdiction should initially be made by the district court. Because the statutory powers are
broad but unclear in scope. Kerner's doubts on this point are not
entirely unfounded. Indeed, they lend added support to the contention
that the entire Thill test and any other primary jurisdiction questions
should have been remanded to the district court.7 However, his statements extolling the federal courts as "repositories of antitrust expertise" are misdirected. The federal courts' traditional antitrust expertise is not a relevant factor because the involvement of a regulatory
act alters the antitrust test. Where the plaintiff has alleged a per se
violation by an Exchange, the real controversy on the merits of the
antitrust claim will center on whether the challenged practice is justified by the Commodities Exchange Act and not whether the facts
adduced in evidence prove the per se allegation. The presence or absence of a statutory grant of agency powers to remedy anticompetitive
behavior and to immunize industry practices from antitrust consequences should thus control the issue of allocating primary jurisdic72
tion.
The result in Ricci illustrates the uncertainty that presently pervades any resolution of primary jurisdiction under antitrust claims.
At one extreme the doctrines of uniformity, supersession, and expertise73 favor an administrative disposition of antitrust claims, while at
the other extreme, the theories requiring a statutory grant of power
to immunize and power to enforce antitrust laws 74 incline toward an
75
expansion of federal court jurisdiction.
70. Id. at 723, citing, 433 F.2d at 273.
71. See note 49 supra.
72. The recent case of Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 29 AD. L. 2D 1069 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), cited Kerner's resolution of the primary jurisdiction question in Ricci with approval.
Seligson involved another antitrust suit against a commodities exchange. The district court
refused to invoke primary jurisdiction, ostensibly for reasons of judicial economy since the
parties had already undergone five years of discovery and pre-trial motions.
73. See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
75. Professor Jaffe has criticized this "assumption of exclusive alternatives," especially
where the antitrust and regulatory laws are both designed to safeguard the public's economic

interest. JAFFE 148.

